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I. INTRODUCTION

Three decades ago, in the landmark search and seizure case of Terry
v Ohio,' Chief Justice Warren wrote: "intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate
hunches [are] a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction."2
* To my family and friends who know me so well, yet choose to love me anyway.
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. Id. at 22 (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV
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In Terry, the Supreme Court first distinguished between different types
of intrusions when it decided that probable cause3 was not necessary for
police to stop and investigate an individual suspected of criminal
activity.4 Rather, all that was required was a lower level of certainty,
reasonable suspicion.
The main impetus behind Terry was law enforcement's need for a
more flexible method of investigating criminal activity in the wake of
ever increasing urban crime. Although the Court acknowledged that
allowing this flexibility arguably interfered with liberty and personal
security interests of the individual, it found that "stop and frisks" 7 based
on reasonable suspicion were justified because they amounted to a
"minor inconvenience and petty indignity."8
While Fourth Amendment protections may have been weakened by
the Terry decision, citizens could nevertheless take comfort in the fact
that they could not be stopped on the street based on the mere whims of
an officer.9 To allow law enforcement to act in such a manner would
contradict the very purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 0 The
Amendment's framers clearly sought to put an end to the use of
arbitrary police power which was so commonplace in colonial times."

3. Probable cause is a rather difficult concept to define.
According to the Supreme Court, "probable cause" to arrest exists when the facts
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime, and "probable cause"
to search exists when the same prudent person would believe that the evidence or
persons to be seized are located at the place to be searched.
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION 121

(1993) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949)).
4. "Probable cause was the sole investigative standard recognized by the Court until
1968." Id. Other levels of certainty include reasonable suspicion, and a level essentially similar
to relevance which is used in administrative investigations. See id. at 121-22.
5. Seeid.at 121. The Supreme Court defined reasonable suspicion as a level of certainty
based on "specific and articulable facts," rather than on a hunch, but also made clear that it was
meant to represent a lower standard than probable cause. See id.
6. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
7. "Stop and frisk" should be distinguished from a full arrest because the suspect is only
stopped briefly and if there is a suspicion that the suspect is armed, he is frisked for weapons.
See id.
8. Id. (citing People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (1964)).
9. See Janet Koven Levit, PretextualTrafficStops:United States v. Whren andthe Death
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LoY. U. CH. L.J. 145, 155 (1996).
10. See id. at 167.
11. See id. at 168.
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Reasonable suspicion provided the necessary safeguard by preventing the
use of such arbitrary power.1 2 While the Court did not provide a
precise definition of reasonable suspicion,
it is clear that it must amount
13
to more than an unsubstantiated hunch.
In Terry, for example, a police officer, patrolling an area to which
he had been assigned for thirty years, developed reasonable suspicion
after observing the strange behavior of two men he had never seen
before.' 4 These men alternately paced back and forth in front of a store
window, repeatedly peering into the window more than five times each
over a period of about ten minutes. 5 After each time, the men would
confer with one another. 6 At one point, a third man joined the two for
a conference, and then left. 7 The officer, who at this point had become
thoroughly suspicious, followed the two men where they joined up with
the third man a couple of blocks away' 8 Fearing that the men may be
armed and about to commit a robbery, the officer stopped the men and
conducted a frisk of their coats for weapons. 9 This extensive, suspicious behavior, which, according to the Court, clearly amounted to more
than simple "window shopping," was enough to justify the temporary
seizure of the men. 0
Thirty years later, Terry is still the law of the land. Technically, a
police officer cannot constitutionally stop an individual based on a mere
hunch. However, due to the Supreme Court's holding in Whren v.
United States,"' police officers can now, in effect, do exactly that. 2
This Note discusses the Whren decision and its impact since it was
decided more than a year ago. Part II focuses on the Whren decision
itself, and how Whren has made it possible for law enforcement to
circumscribe the long-standing reasonable suspicion standard established
in Terry. Part III discusses how the comprehensive nature of the traffic
code has given the police practically unbridled discretion in deciding
when they can detain a motorist. Part IV shows how this discretion has
12.
stopping
13.
14.

See id. at 155 (stating "[a] reasonable suspicion requirement prevents the state from
individuals based merely upon whims, hunches, suspicions, and prejudices").
See id.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.

15. See id. at 6.
16. See id.
17. See id.

18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 23.
21. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
22. The only limitation is that a person has to be driving; probable cause for any traffic
violation will suffice for a reasonable stop regardless of an officer's true intentions. See generally
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had its biggest impact on minorities by increasing the problem of racial
discrimination in the use of traffic enforcement activities to search for
evidence of criminal activity. Part V examines two primary types of Whren
stops which have evolved--one of which not only minimizes the
problem of discrimination, but also minimizes the likelihood that law
enforcement will exceed the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, Part VI discusses specific practices which should be prohibited
by law enforcement under certain circumstances.
II. BLOWING WHREN WAY OUT OF PROPORTION
The facts of Whren are quite simple. Two plainclothes officers in an
unmarked car were patrolling a high drug area in the District of
Columbia.23 The officers drove past a truck waiting at a stop sign, and
noticed the driver looking down into the lap of the passenger seated next
to him.2" The truck remained stopped at the intersection for more than
twenty seconds. 5 When the officers turned their car around and headed
toward the stopped vehicle, the truck made a right turn without
signaling, and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed.26
Arguably, the officers did not have probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, to temporarily stop the motorists in order to investigate
other criminal activity they suspected.27 However, the officers did have
probable cause to believe that the driver had violated several provisions
of the District of Columbia's traffic code. 28 After overtaking the truck,
one of the officers approached the vehicle to give the driver a warning
concerning the violations observed. 29 At this point the officer immediately observed the passenger holding in plain view what appeared to be
two bags of crack cocaine.3" Both the driver and the passenger were

23. See id. at 1772.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. The defendants did not argue that the police officers lacked probable cause to
believe that the traffic code had been violated. See id. One of the violations was simply for
"fail[ing] to give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle." Id. In addition, the
officers did not think the defendants were speeding, but simply "driving at a speed greater than
[was] reasonable and prudent under the conditions." Id. at 1772-73.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1772. There is a "plain view" exception to the general requirement that a
search warrant is necessary to conduct a search. Providing there is a valid reason for the stop,
evidence of a crime or contraband that is in plain view can be seized. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,484-90 (1971). The plain view sighting ofthe evidence or contraband,
however, need not be inadvertent. See generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
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arrested, more drugs were subsequently seized from the vehicle, and the
two were indicted later for violating federal drug laws.3
In an attempt to exclude the drug evidence at trial, the defendants
argued that the officers' real reason for making the stop had nothing to
do with enforcing the traffic code.32 In other words, they asserted that
the traffic violation was a mere pretext-a false excuse to stop the
vehicle. 3 The issue for the Court in Whren was whether such
pretextual stops were violative of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable seizures." The Court unanimously upheld the
constitutionality of pretextual stops, holding that such stops are
reasonable so long as probable cause exists to believe a traffic violation
has occurred. 35 The actual motivations of 36the individual officers are
irrelevant to the reasonableness of the stop.
At first glance, Whren seems to make a great deal of sense. After all,
long before Whren was decided, automobile stops were reasonable when
the police had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred.37 In holding that such stops could be made regardless of an
officer's true intentions, however, the Court enabled the police to do
what they clearly could not do prior to Whren-stop and investigate
criminal activity unrelated to the traffic violation with less than
reasonable suspicion. 38 As a matter of fact, virtually any hunch will do
for a constitutional stop. Taking a closer look at Whren, it appears that
motorists across the country have been, in effect, completely stripped of
any and all Fourth Amendment protections.

31. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772. There also were other drugs in the vehicle seized in
a search incident to the arrest of the defendants. Id.

32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1771. Defendants argued that the test should be "whether a police officer,
acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given." Id. at 1773. The Court
believed that the test should be simplywhether the officer couldhave made the stop. See id.One

commentator has noted: "The adoption of the 'could' standard, thereby blindly sanctioning
pretextual traffic stops, ignores and circumvents reasonable suspicion and, concomitantly,
undermines the purpose behind the Fourth Amendment." Levit, supra note 9, at 167.
35. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.

36. See id. at 1774.
37. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).
38. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773. The defendants argued that pretextual stops create the
temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, for which only

a hunch exists. See id.
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Ill. TRAFFIC CODES AND THE PROBLEM OF
IMPOSSIBLE COMPLIANCE

Consider the following scenario: a police officer, after observing a
young male for just a moment, develops a hunch that he is dealing
drugs. The officer cannot articulate anything specific about the man that
would justify his hunch, and so he certainly does not have the requisite
suspicion to stop and investigate at this point.39 Fortunately for the
officer, the man gets into his car and drives away. Now, the officer has
virtually
unlimited discretion to stop the driver any time and for any
40
reason.

This result occurs because driving codes are typically so extensive
that no driver can travel three blocks without violating the law in at least
some small way.41 In fact, a study of a particular stretch of highway
between Baltimore and Delaware revealed that ninety-three percent of
all drivers committed at least one traffic violation.42 These statistics are
certainly not surprising considering that the traffic code regulates
everything from taillights to tire tread. 4' A motorist can be stopped not
only for driving too fast, but also for driving too slow or simply for
driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
circumstances.' Thus, an officer can stop a motorist for actually
adhering to the posted speed limit. There is certainly a problem with the
comprehensive nature of the traffic code when a motorist can be stopped
even when he is doing everything possible to comply with the law.
One case, Florida v. Corvin,45 reveals just how far Whren can be
stretched to justify a traffic stop which ultimately leads to the discovery
of drugs. The governing traffic law prohibited the operation of a vehicle
without a validation sticker on the license tag. 46 According to the
arresting officer, the motorist's license tag was bent in the corner to the
point that the sticker was unreadable. 47 First, the trial court's finding
that the officer thought the sticker was unreadable proves that there was,

39. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
40. See David A. Harris, Whren v. United States: PretextualTraffic Stops and "Driving
While Black," 21 CHAMPION 44, 41 (1997) (stating that because the traffic codes are so
extensive, police "have virtually unlimited discretion").
41. See id.
42. See Whitehead v. Maryland, 1997 WL 542954, at *6 n.4 (Md. App.).
43. See Harris, supra note 40, at 41.
44. See id. This was one of the violations that the motorist in Whren was suspected of
committing. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
45. 677 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
46. See id. at 948.
47. See id.
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in fact, a sticker on the tag.48 Therefore, there was no true violation in
the first place. 9 Also, the stop occurred at 4 a.mi -a time at which,
the trial court noted, no tag is readable.5 If the tag is unreadable, then
certainly the sticker is unreadable. 5 2 Holding that the stop was
pretextual, the seized drug evidence was suppressed based on a pre- Whren
holding. 3
On appeal, however, the case was overturned in light of Whren.54
The appellate court noted the fallacies described above, in addition to
55
the fact that the officer had no other suspicions about the motorist.
Nevertheless, it held that probable cause existed to believe a traffic law
had been violated, and therefore, it reversed the trial court. 6
It is clear that no matter how minor and insignificant the infraction,
and regardless of whether such infractions are regularly enforced or ever
enforced at all, Whren provides the constitutional foundation for the
stop.57 In fact, it almost seems as though the only way one can prevent
being stopped by a police officer based on a random hunch is by staying
off the roads altogether.
IV

WHR EN'S STAMP OF APPROVAL ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

The law is clear. As long as an officer has the statutory authority
under the traffic code to make a stop, the officer's subjective motivations for making the stop are absolutely irrelevant and will not be
considered in determining whether the stop was reasonable under the

48. See id. The appellate court noted: "We first observe that the trial court's finding that
officers stopped the vehicle because the decal was 'unreadable' is contrary to the stipulated fact
that the officer originally thought the tag contained 'no decal' at all." Id. at 948-49.

49. Section 320.07, Florida Statutes (1993) only makes it a violation to drive "without"
a sticker, not with an unreadable one.
50. See Corvin, 677 So. 2d at 948.

51. See id.
52. See id. (stating that the officer's observation that the sticker was illegible was
unpersuasive).
53. See id. The trial court based its holding on Kehoe v State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.
1988). See Corvin, 677 So. 2d at 948. The Corvin court explained that Kehoe used the
"reasonable officer" test to determine if a traffic stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. See id. In other words, a reasonable officer would not have stopped a motorist at

4 a.m. for the alleged registration sticker violation. See id.
54. See Corvin, 677 So. 2d at 949.
55. See id. at 949-50.

56. See id.
57. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776. Whren applies to all traffic violations and does not
require officers to have more than probable cause for those violations that are minor or technical.

See id.
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Fourth Amendment." This result may hold true even in the following
situation.
Consider a police officer who has the personal belief that all AfricanAmericans are involved in illegal drug activity in one way or another.
Based on this belief, the officer decides to stop only African-Americans
who exceed the speed limit, and ignores all other drivers regardless of
their excessive speed. According to the Supreme Court, these stops are
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 9
The hypothetical described above is unfortunately a reality. Discrimination on the nation's roadways is a problem that began long before
Whren. ° For example, in 1992 in Volusia County, Florida, a study was
conducted of local law enforcement traffic stop procedures.61 More
than 140 hours of videotape were compiled consisting of almost 1110
traffic stops. 6z The results were quite revealing. More than seventy
percent of all the traffic stops involved African-American drivers.6
This statistic is even more startling considering that African-Americans
made up less than ten percent of the drivers on the particular highway
involved in the study. 4 In addition, African-American drivers were
detained twice as long, on average, as were white drivers, and also 6were
twice as likely to have their cars searched subsequent to the stop.
The results of the Volusia County study are only one example of
obviously discriminatory stops. A similar study in Maryland revealed
almost identical, discriminatory practices by law enforcement using the
traffic code.66 So common is the practice of discriminating against
African-Americans in enforcing the traffic code, that a term for a new
type of traffic violation has been coined: "Driving While Black."67

58. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *5 (explaining that the actual motivation of the

officer cannot be subject to constitutional inquiry or challenge).
59.See Harris, supra note 40, at 42 (explaining that law enforcement's use of the vast
discretionary power granted to it under Whren to stop more African-Americans does not, by
itself, violate the Fourth Amendment).
60. See id.
61. See David A. Harris, Traffic Stops of Minorities: Unequal Justice Under Law,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 1997, at G3.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Harris, supra note 40, at 42. In the Maryland study, 18 months worth of data
revealed that of all motorists stopped and then searched, either through consent or with the use
of a drug-sniffing dog, almost 80% were African-Americans. See id.
67. Angela J.Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAM L. REV. 425, 425
(1997).
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The Supreme Court could have seized the opportunity in Whren to
remedy discriminatory pretextual traffic stops. However, it avoided
the issue almost entirely. Devoting only two sentences of the entire
decision to the issue of discrimination, the Court stated that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application
of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis." 69 The Court cannot technically be accused of
condoning discriminatory practices.7" However, designating the Equal
Protection Clause as the sole remedy for a discriminatory claim is
tantamount to doing just that.
Bringing an equal protection claim requires an individual to prove
that the officer, or other agent of the State, acted intentionally to
discriminate against him based on his race. 7 ' Meeting this burden is no
easy task, despite the statistical evidence available which would tend to
support such a claim.72 For example, an African-American living in
Volusia County would not be able to successfully prove his claim simply
by submitting the available study which clearly shows that members of
his race are stopped in that county at a much higher rate than members
of other races.73
The Supreme Court requires an individual to prove that similarly
situated individuals could have been stopped for the same traffic offense,
but were not.74 In other words, an African-American motorist would
have to show that a white motorist was observed by an officer committing the same violation under similar circumstances, yet was not stopped.
Proving this absence of action is most definitely easier said than done.
After all, police officers keep records of only the motorists they stopped,
not of those whom they could have stopped, but did not.75 It is
therefore apparent that short of an officer admitting he stopped a driver

68. The African-American defendants in Whren argued that police officers might decide
which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as race. See Whren, 116
S. Ct. at 1773.
69. Id. at 1774.
70. The Supreme Court did not condone discrimination. It merely stated that discrimination
was an equal protection issue, not a Fourth Amendment issue. See id.
71. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
72. Showing a discriminatory effect by statistical evidence is not, in itself, enough.
Discriminatory intent also must be proven. See id. at 240-41.
73. See id.
74. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1488 (1996).
75. See Davis, supra note 67, at 437.
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because of race, raising a successful equal protection challenge will be
a near impossibility.76
Minorities have made accusations of discriminatory practices by law
enforcement in the use of traffic stops for a long time.77 In fact, the
Volusia County study was conducted four years before the Whren
decision. 78 Whren is simply responsible for making the situation worse
by providing law enforcement with the constitutional foundation for
engaging in such discriminatory practices. 79 As will be discussed later,
pretextual stops can be conducted in a manner that will at least minimize
the risk of discrimination.
V Two TYPES OF PRETEXTUAL STOPS
It seems as though law enforcement has taken full advantage of the
Court's liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Whren. By all
indications, pretextual traffic stops have significantly increased all over
the country since Whren.8" To make matters worse, the Supreme Court
provided no guidance as to how far the police may go in detaining and
interrogating someone who has been stopped under the pretext of traffic
code enforcement. 81 As a result, the traffic code has suddenly become
one of law enforcement's most effective weapons in fighting the war on
drugs.
It is important to keep in mind that the stop in Whren was extremely
brief.8 2 Regardless of why the officer stopped the vehicle, the fact
remains that as soon as he approached the vehicle, drugs were seen in
the
plain view in the passenger's hands. It was on these facts that
84
Supreme Court gave its stamp of approval for pretextual stops.
However, not all traffic stops which lead to arrests run as smoothly
or quickly as did the one in Whren. Obviously, most drug dealers do not

76. See id. at 435. "It would be quite difficult for a black motorist to prove that a police
officer stopped or detained him because of his race." Id.
77. See Harris,supranote 61, at G3. "[African-Americans] had been saying for years that
police regularly stopped and searched them, but few people listened." Id.
78. The \Nblusia County study was conducted in 1992. See Harris, supranote 61, at G3.
79. See Harris, supra note 40, at 42 (stating with regard to using traffic stops to
discriminate against African-Americans, "we can predict what Whren will lead to because it was
happening already"). Additionally, Harris states that the Supreme Court has given its "stamp of
approval" to discrimination in pretextual traffic stops. See id.
80. See Whitehead v. Maryland, 1997 WL 542954, at *2.
81. See id. at *5 (emphasizing that Whren was a unanimous decision without concurring
opinions).
82. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
83. See id.
84. See Harris, supranote 40, at 42.
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hold their contraband in their hands when a police officer approaches the
vehicle. The methods available to law enforcement once they stop the
vehicle to further detain the motorist and search the vehicle are so
numerous that every traffic stop can easily be turned into a search for
other criminal activity. 5
While every traffic stop tends to be unique, stops which are
admittedly pretextual have emerged in two basic forms. After considering these two types separately, it is clear that one is preferable because
it limits the potential for abuse under Whren. The other demonstrates
how law enforcement typically violates the Fourth Amendment by
exercising authority that it lacks even after Whren's liberal holding.
A. "Cookie-Cutter" Whren
An example of the first type of stop to be discussed occurred as part
of an effort to stop the flow of drugs into Pinellas County, Florida.86
The local police department set up a highway taskforce which used the
traffic code as a means to stop cars to search for drugs." The taskforce
operated as follows: police officers would stop each motorist observed
to be in violation of Florida's traffic code on a particular stretch of
road. 8 Following the stop, a detective would approach the vehicle and
ask the driver to accompany him to the police car. 9 The driver would
then be asked for his consent to search the vehicle. 90 If the driver
consented, one officer would run a computer check on the driver and
vehicle, while another officer searched the vehicle. 9' If the driver
refused, the officers would use a narcotics detection dog to sniff the
vehicle, as dog sniffs do not qualify as a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment.92
85. See Levit, supranote 9, at 145-46. The officer may: (1) conduct a protective search
of the driver, passengers, and vehicle for weapons if suspicion of danger exists; (2) seize
contraband in plain view provided the stop itself is valid; (3) conduct a search incident to arrest;
(4) use the time necessary to check the vehicle and registration to develop reasonable suspicion
necessary to further detain the driver; or (5) ask the driver for voluntary consent to search the
vehicle. See id.
86. See United States v. Holloman, 113 F3d 192, 193 (11th Cir. 1997).
87. See id.The constitutionality of this practice recently was upheld in light of Whren. See
id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. The Supreme Court, in dictum, in United States v. Place,462 U.S. 696 (1983),
said that a drug sniff is not a search because it "discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item." SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, at 194 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
The defendant in Holloman tried to distinguish his stop from the one in Whrn by arguing that
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It is important to take note of the cookie-cutter fashion in which the
stops of this operation are conducted. First, each motorist observed
violating the traffic code is stopped, regardless of any individualized
suspicion of drug activity.93 Therefore, this operation is less susceptible
to claims of discrimination. Second, each motorist is subjected to an
identical post-stop procedure.9 4 A motorist cannot complain that he was
subjected to a more aggressive95attempt by the officers to search the
vehicle than any other motorist.
Also noteworthy is the efficiency of the operation. Multiple officers
are involved in each stop and an on-site narcotics detection dog is
readily available if consent is refused by the motorist.96 At all times,
therefore, the pretextual purpose of the traffic stop is being carried
out. 9 7 While the search of the car is being conducted by one officer,
the computer check of the motorist is being conducted by another.98
Such checks are routine practice for a traffic stop even when the officer
has no intention of searching for drugs.9 9 Additionally, once the radio
report is received which indicates that there are no problems with the
motorist or the vehicle, the detention is concluded by either issuing a
citation or an oral warning." °
The benefit in this cookie-cutter operation is such that every stop is
conducted quickly and efficiently. This is important because the
Supreme Court has held that an intrusion must last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 01 If reasonable suspi-

the drugs in Whren were in plain view and that there was no required detention or search. See
Holloman, 113 E3d at 194. In Holloman, the defendant argued, there was a detention and a
search. See id.This argument failed because a dog sniff is not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. See id. The Holloman court reasoned that this case was therefore analytically
indistinguishable from Whren. See id. Additionally, the defendant argued that the case was
similar to an unlawful roving patrol rather than a constitutionally permissible roadblock stop. Id.
The court said that the roadblock and roving stop cases "concerned whether, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, the Government may temporarily detain motorists in the absence ofprobable
cause or reasonable articulable suspicion." Id. Since the seizure in this case was based on
probable cause, the court dismissed the argument. See id.
93. See supra text accompanying note 88.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
95. This approach also makes the post-detention period less susceptible to claims of
discrimination.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
97. The pretext is the violation of the traffic code for which the motorist is stopped. The
true purpose of the task force is to stop the flow of drugs.
98. See supra text accompanying note 91.
99. A computer check is part of the "legitimate investigative detention in the wake of a
traffic stop." Levit, supranote 9, at 154.
100. See Holloman, 113 F.3d at 193.
101. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
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cion to continue the detention of the motorist does not develop during
the time necessary to issue a warning or citation for the observed
violation, then the stop must end."0 2 Any detention beyond the time
necessary to issue the citation is deemed a second stop." 3 Therefore,
if reasonable suspicion is lacking, any evidence discovered during the
second stop will be excluded as the fruit of an unconstitutional
search. °4
B. Random Stops Under Whren
Whren does not restrict pretextual traffic stops to the cookie-cutter

type described in the above Pinellas County operation. In a random stop,
the second type to be described, the decision to stop a vehicle occurs in
an arbitrary manner. In addition, law enforcement may use other
techniques following the traffic stop other than simply asking for the
driver's consent.0 s The efficiency of these random stops also suffers
when the stops are not part of an organized operation. Obviously, if a

102. See Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 243, 248 (1990).
103. See id. In Snow, the driver was stopped by an officer for speeding, and appeared to
the officer to be somewhat nervous. See id. at 247. The officer was on the lookout for drugs,
considering the particular stretch of road involved. See id. After noticing three air fresheners
hanging from the rear view mirror, the officer believed that the driver may have been attempting
to conceal the odor of narcotics. See id.At some point, both the driver and passengerwere asked
to exit the vehicle. See id. After the officer issued a traffic warning for speeding, he requested
permission to search the car. See id.at 248. The driver refused, and the officer then used a K-9
dog to sniff the car for narcotics. See id. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a
subsequent search turned up heroin. See id.The court in Snow held that the purpose of the stop
was fulfilled as soon as the officer issued the warning for speeding. See id. Additionally, the
court found that the State did not demonstrate a reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue the
detention beyond the warning. See id.at 265. The fact that the driver was nervous and avoided
eye contact with the officer did notjustify a detention because this is common of most motorists
during a confrontational traffic stop. See id. at 260. The driver's use of a stretch of highway on
which drug trafficking was common did not distinguish him from any other driver on the road.
See id.Furthermore, air fresheners in a car are common for both their functional and ornamental
capacity. See id. at 261. The court reasoned that the three air fresheners could merely indicate
that the driver added one at a time, still considering the old one to be useful. See id. Finally,
exercising the constitutional right to refuse consent is no indicator that one is involved in
carrying drugs. See id. at 262. While the officer's "hunch" of drug activity in this case turned
out to be correct, it did not justify the continued seizure of the driver, which was an additional
intrusion on his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 267.
104. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The reasoning behind viewing a detention
beyond the time it takes to issue a traffic warning or citation as a separate, distinct detention is
derived from a main tenet of the landmark Terrycase discussed earlier: "the scope of the search
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)).
105. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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single officer is making the stop, he cannot effectively do two things at
the same time. Therefore, if the requisite reasonable suspicion does not
develop, the likelihood increases that the detention will continue for a
longer period than is constitutionally permissible. 6
The very recent case of Whitehead v Maryland,'07 decided by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, provides a perfect example of a
random stop which at first glance appears no more intrusive than a
uniform stop. However, a closer look reveals several key differences
which ultimately make the stop unconstitutional.10 8 It also demonstrates the need for limiting an officer's conduct subsequent to a
pretextual stop.
The police officer in this case was part of a special highway
taskforce, similar to the Pinellas County taskforce, organized to enforce
the controlled dangerous substance laws."° Accompanied by a K-9
narcotics dog, the officer pulled over a motorist who was exceeding the
speed limit.11 Unlike the systematic operation described above, the
officer did not stop all drivers he observed speeding."' In fact, testimony showed that the officer only selected particular vehicles which
exceeded the speed limit and ignored others. 2 As a result, there was
little doubt that the officer's decision to stop the driver for speeding was
a pretext for further investigating his suspicion that3 the vehicle and its
occupants were connected with narcotics activity.1
Subsequent to the stop, the officer asked the driver to produce his4
license and registration, but the driver could only produce the latter."
Therefore, the officer ordered the driver out of the car, but told the
passenger to remain seated."' The officer in this case, unlike the
officers involved in the Pinellas County stops, did not have a standard

106. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
107. 1997 WTL 542954 (Md. App.).
108. The stop itself was not unconstitutional. See id. at *5. However, the portion of the
detention subsequent to the stop, which exceeded the time necessary to issue a warning or
citation, was unconstitutional. See id.
109. See id. at *2.
110. See id. at**1.

111. See id. The court stated, "We, consequently, can and do properly infer that [the
officer's] selection of particular vehicles violating the speed limits, while ignoring others, is
influenced by his suspicion that the occupants may, in addition to speeding, also be in violation
of the criminal laws that he has been detailed to enforce." Id. at *2.
112. See id.
113. See id.

114. See id. at *1.
115. See id.
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operating procedure which was adhered to6 in attempting to investigate
narcotics activity subsequent to the stop."
After separating the driver and passenger, the officer asked the driver
where he had been on his travels." 7 Shortly thereafter, the officer
posed the same question to the passenger and received a slightly
different response."' At this point, the officer claimed he became
suspicious of the men." 9 Meanwhile, the officer contacted the station
via radio to check if the driver had any outstanding warrants, if he had
a valid driver's license, and also to verify that the car had, not been
reported stolen. 20
The driver then was asked to sit in the police cruiser, where the
officer requested the driver's consent to search the vehicle. 2 ' The
driver subsequently became nervous and began to stutter.122 In addition, he refused to sign the consent form.'
Meanwhile, the officer received a report which indicated that the
driver had a valid driver's license, that he was not wanted on any
124
outstanding warrants, and that the car he was driving was not stolen.
Nevertheless, the officer continued the detention while he conducted a
scan of the car for narcotics with his K-9 police dog. 2 ' The dog

116. Nothing in Whiteheadindicatesthat the officer used the same procedure following a
traffic stop for a violation of the traffic code to look for signs of other criminal activity. The
only reference to any standard technique was the officer asking for consent to search the vehicle
to observe the motorist's reaction to the request. See id. Nothing indicates that the officer asked
all stopped motorists for consent.
117. See id.
118. See id. The driver revealed that he had come from New Jersey where he had visited
his grandmother the previous Saturday, and was returning to Baltimore. See id. The passenger
responded similarly. His response, however, differed in that he said they had visited friends, and
also that they had visited New Jersey on the previous Sunday (not Saturday). See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.; supra text accompanying note 99.
122. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *1.
123. See id. The officer testified that he typically did this to observe the motorist's reaction.
Id. at *4. The Supreme Court has held that the validity of a purported consent to a search is
determined by a "voluntariness" test. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEizURE: A
TREATSE ON THE FouTm AMENDMENT § 8.2 (3d ed. 1996). Whether a consent to a search was
"voluntary" is a question of fact determined from the totality of all the circumstances. See id.
Also noteworthy is the Supreme Court's recent holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to
search will be recognized as voluntary. See Ohio v. Robinette 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). The
Court found that it would be unrealistic to require law enforcement to always inform detainees
that they may leave. See id.
124. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *1.
125. See id.
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alerted to the presence of drugs near the driver's door, and a subsequent
search by the officer turned up crack cocaine in a bag behind the
driver's seat. 26 At trial, a motion to suppress the evidence found
during the traffic stop was denied, and the driver was convicted of
violating narcotics laws.127
The outcome of this random Whren stop was indeed desirable. After
all, a drug dealer was convicted and sent to jail. It must not be
forgotten, however, that even drug dealers are protected by the Fourth
Amendment, which still exists, despite the Whren decision. On appeal,
the conviction was overturned, and the court held that the officer
exceeded the limits which govern
a search subsequent to a stop for
128
violation of the traffic laws.
In deciding that the detention in Whitehead was unconstitutional, the
court strictly adhered to the Supreme Court's holding that a detention
must be no longer than is necessary to carry out the purpose of the
stop.' 29 Considering that the entire detention lasted only five minutes, 3 ' it is clear that a brief stop will not automatically qualify as
constitutional. The Whitehead court found that nothing occurred during
the time it took to complete the purpose of the stop to justify further
detaining the motorist to conduct the K-9 search.'
Even though this stop is precisely the type which Whren unanimously
upheld, 3 2 it differs dramatically from the type of stop described earlier
which was part of a more organized, systematic operation. Immediately,

126. See id.

127. See id.
128. See id. at *5. After the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Whren case, but before its
decision, the WashingtonPost printed an editorial which stated, "It is difficult for many people
to accept that a drug conviction can be overturned simply because it was not reasonable for the
police to have stopped the car in the first place." Drugsand CarSearches:An Editorial,WAsH.
POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at A20. Whren's holding made the stop itself reasonable. See Whren, 116
S. Ct. at 1777. It is no doubt equally difficult for people to accept that a five minute detention
like the one in Whitehead which ultimately turned up drugs was unconstitutional. See
Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954.
129. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *2 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500

(1983)).
130. See id. at *1. The Supreme Court has said that the brevity of the intrusion on an
individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining if the seizure is

so minimally intrusive as to be justified by reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
131. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *5. The Whiteheadcourtstated: "There is nothing
that [the officer] observed that even remotely indicates an involvement in the transportation of
drugs." Id.
132. See id. "We are mindful of the Supreme Court's opinion in Whren that put an officer's
motivation for stopping a motor vehicle beyond attack for purposes of suppressing the fruits of
a search." Id.
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the random type of stop is more susceptible to claims of discrimination
because the race of the driver may be what motivates the officer to
decide which speeders to stop. Such an accusation cannot easily be made
when all traffic offenders are stopped. Additionally, since the officer
only stops those motorists whom he has a hunch may be involved in
narcotics, it is more likely that he will detain the motorist longer than
necessary in order to investigate his hunch."'
VI. RESTRICTING PRETEXTUAL STOPS

One way to prevent the Whren decision from turning every temporary traffic stop into an extended, and therefore, unconstitutional
stop,'34 is to strictly limit an officer's conduct during a stop when
reasonable suspicion is absent."' Whitehead serves as a perfect
example of certain practices that should be restricted if a stop is
conducted in the random manner just described. As the court stated:
We think it would be a mistake to read Whren as allowing
law enforcement officers to detain on the pretext of issuing
a traffic citation or warning, and then deliberately to engage
in activities not related to the enforcement of the traffic
code in order to determine whether there are sufficient
indicia of some illegal activity.'36
A. Questioning Occupants Duringa Whren Stop
One activity which occurred in Whitehead, common to many
investigations following a traffic stop, was the questioning of the vehicle
occupants to further a hunch of suspicious behavior.'37 As noted
earlier, the driver and passenger gave slightly conflicting responses
regarding where they had been."3 However, there is nothing about a
driver and passenger not having identical stories as to exactly where they

133. It logically follows that if an officer stops a speeding vehicle because he has a hunch
the vehicle contains drugs, he will attempt to prove his hunch correct. It also follows that such
a stop will tend to run longer than a stop for speeding where no such suspicion exists.
134. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
135. If reasonable suspicion of criminal activity develops during the normal course of the
traffic stop, then the detention may be constitutionally continued. See supratext accompanying
note 85. The Whitehead court indicated that such suspicion could arise from noticing the

presence of scales, bongs, glassine bags, or other instruments which may have a lawful use, but
also are commonly used to conduct narcotics activity. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *5.
136. Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *5.
137. See id. at *1; supranotes 117-18 and accompanying text.
138. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *1; supra text accompanying note 118.
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were, why they were there, and when they left, that would justifiably
lead a police
officer to conclude that they were involved in narcotics
139
activity.

Furthermore, such an inquiry is in no way related to the enforcement
of the traffic code. The officer was not asking these questions to
determine why the driver was speeding or to try to prevent the driver
from speeding in the future." He was
merely doing this to obtain
141
justification for searching the vehicle.
Although the court in Whitehead did not in any way prohibit the use
of such questions during a stop for a violation of the traffic code, these
inquiries ought to be prohibited. After all, the most that could arise is
an inconsistent response from the driver and passenger. Since the court
correctly points out that inconsistent responses do not create an inference
of narcotics activity,142 such inquiries have no utility. In fact, these
inquiries have the undesirable effect of increasing the length of the
detention. 43 If the officer should at all times be doing whatever is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, then asking irrelevant
questions is improper.
B. K-9 Searches by a Single Officer
Another activity which should be prohibited under certain circumstances is the use of a K-9 dog to sniff for narcotics when a driver
refuses to give consent to search the vehicle. As is demonstrated in
Whitehead, when a traffic stop is made by a single officer, 1" it is
likely that using a K-9 will result in an extended, unconstitutional
detention.
This result is the case because a police officer conducting a traffic
stop is required to issue the citation or warning efficiently and expeditiously.1 45 If an officer asks for consent and the motorist refuses, as he
is entitled to do, then an officer can resort to using a K-9 dog.
Again,
1 46
even though the use of a dog is not considered a search, it still

139. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *3 (suggesting that asking a motorist where he
has been does not further the enforcement of the posted speed limit).

140. See id. at *4.
141. See id.
142. See id. at *3.
143. An officer should not be asking irrelevant questions when he could be using the time
necessary to ask those questions to issue the citation and to discontinue the detention of the

motorist.
144. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *1.
145. See id. at *4 (stating that this duty arose after the officer received the results of the
computer check which indicated that everything was in order).
146. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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requires a further detention of the motorist. 47 Since the stop in
Whitehead was only five minutes in duration,148 including the time it
took to use the K-9, it is clear that even a short stop can violate an
officer's duty to quickly complete the stop.
Unless a second officer is available to conduct the K-9 scan while the
other officer is conducting the computer check of the motorist, it seems
that the use of a dog will result in an illegal detention in most instances,
absent reasonable suspicion. Additionally, a driver's exercise of his
constitutional right to refuse consent cannot ever be used to justify this
further detention. 49 Therefore, unless the stop is conducted by a
multiple officer taskforce, like the one described in the Pinellas County
operation, 50 K-9 scans will be an unnecessary intrusion exceeding an
officer's constitutional limitations.

VII. CONCLUSION
It seems as though the unanimous Whren decision is here to stay
despite its obvious defects. American motorists are thus forewarned that
as soon as they venture out onto any street or highway, they will
instantly be subjected to the whims of a law enforcement officer. Some
may consider the liberal holding of Whren to be a necessary evil in
fighting the war on drugs. Others may view it as an unnecessary
intrusion on personal privacy, as well as a means whereby law enforcement can easily discriminate against minorities in deciding who to stop.
Debating the issue, however, does not change the law.
It is true that an officer's subjective motivations for making a traffic
stop are constitutionally irrelevant after Whren. However, there are still
limitations following a traffic stop for a violation of the traffic code that
must be strictly enforced if Whren is to be kept from spiraling out of
control. Therefore, a traffic stop should always be conducted in an
expeditious manner that at all times furthers the purpose of the stop,
regardless of the officer's true intention. While Fourth Amendment
protections have been weakened by Whren, limiting pretextual stops in
this manner will ensure that these protections do not completely
disappear.

147. This is true unless, of course, there is more than one officer involved to conduct the
K-9 drug-sniff while the other officer checks the computer for outstanding warrants. See supra

notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
148. See Whitehead, 1997 WL 542954, at *1 (referring to the officer's testimony).

149. See id. at *4.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
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